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Abstract: We offer a new respective to the social efficiency of entry by considering an 
industry with a quantity setting leader and free entry of followers. We show that whether free 
entry with a homogeneous product is socially excessive or insufficient depends on the 
identity of the leader (which is either domestic or foreign), the marginal cost difference 
between the leader and the followers, and whether there are scale economies. In a closed 
economy, entry is socially excessive (insufficient) in the presence of scale economies if the 
marginal cost difference between the leader and the followers is small (large), but without 
scale economies, entry is always socially insufficient. In an open economy with the foreign 
leader, entry is always socially insufficient. Our results show concern to the anti-competitive 
entry regulation policies following the previous literature showing socially excessive entry in 
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Social efficiency of entry with market leaders  
 
1. Introduction 
What is the effect of entry on welfare in an oligopolistic industry? This question has attracted 
attention of the researchers for long time, and is very important for competition policies. It is 
well-known that free entry of firms in a Cournot oligopoly is socially excessive in the 
presence of homogeneous products and perfectly competitive input sector, and is often 
referred as the “excess-entry theorem”.
1 In different contexts and with sequential entry, 
Williamson (1968), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), von Weizsäcker (1980), Perry (1984), Mankiw 
and Whinston (1986), Suzumura and Kiyono (1987), Okuno-Fujiwara and Suzumura (1993), 
Anderson et al. (1995) and Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) show excessive entry in the presence 
of scale economies, while Klemperer (1988), Lahiri and Ono (1988) and Ghosh (2007) 
suggest excessive entry without scale economies but in the presence of marginal cost 
differences.
2 These works provide justifications for anti-competitive entry regulations, and 
may have influenced the policies of several countries. 
As Vives (1988) suggests, whether entry is socially excessive is not of purely 
academic interest. In many countries, governments take actions to foster or deter entry into 
particular industries. For example, in the post-war period, preventing excessive entry was a 
guiding principle in the Japanese industrial policy (see, e.g., Suzumura and Kiyono, 1987 and 
Suzumura, 1995). 
While the existing works provide important insights, they have been restrictive by 
considering firms choosing quantities simultaneously, thus ignoring the effects of dominant 
firms or market leaders. However, it is often found that some firms posses competitive 
                                                            
1 Under excessive entry, social welfare reduces with entry. If entry is insufficient, social welfare increases with 
entry. 
2 Spence (1976) shows welfare reducing entry with asymmetric cost firms in a monopolistically competitive 
market, thus ignoring strategic interactions between the firms.  2 
 
advantage over others and become the market leaders, due to technological, historical or legal 
reasons, or just because entry was not possible at an earlier stage (Etro, 2008). For example, 
patent protection may help the innovators to become market leaders by providing competitive 
advantage over other firms.  
Opinion differs on the minimum size of a dominant firm. Scherer (1980) discusses 
about a leading firm’s market share of 40%, while Landes and Posner (1981) suggest 80% or 
more. The European Union suggests that market shares of 80% show clear evidence of 
dominance and market share of 40-50% strongly implies the ability to exploit strategic 
advantage against rivals (George and Jacquemin, 1992). The US merger guidelines contain a 
“Leading firm proviso” based on a market share of at least 35% (US department of justice, 
1988).  
There are several evidences of dominant firms or market leaders. For example, Pot 
Noodle brand, which is Unilever’s original instant hot snack, is the UK & Ireland’s No. 1 Pot 
Snack with a 77% market share 
(http://www.unilever.co.uk/brands/foodbrands/Pot_Noodle.aspx). The big four supermarkets 
in the UK (Tesco, Asda, Sainsbury’s and Morrisons) now account for three-quarters of the 
grocery market and about 7000 small or independent shops closed in London in the past 10 
years (BBC News London, 28 July 2010: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-
10785782), which concern both the citizens and the policy makers. Two large insurance 
companies cornered 98% of the market in Hawaii 2007, and in California, the most 
competitive of the states surveyed, two insurance companies controlled 44% of the market 
(CNBC, 18 September 2009, http://www.cnbc.com/id/32918263).  
As mentioned in Martin (2001), if there are dominant firms or market leaders, it is 
customary to consider Stackelberg competition instead of Cournot competition. Hence, the 3 
 
previous works analyzing welfare effects of entry under Cournot competition may not be 
appropriate in the presence of market leaders. 
In this paper we offer a new perspective to the excess entry literature by considering 
free entry in an industry with a market leader. We consider an industry with a Stackelberg 
leader and large number of potential followers, who decide whether or not to enter the 
industry, where entry requires a fixed investment. In this framework, we show that whether 
free entry in an industry with a homogeneous product is socially excessive or insufficient 
depends on the identity of the leader (which is either domestic or foreign), the marginal cost 
difference between the leader and the followers, and whether there are scale economies. In a 
closed economy, entry is excessive (insufficient) in the presence of scale economics if the 
marginal cost difference between the leader and the followers is small (large), but, without 
scale economies, entry is always socially insufficient. In an open economy with the foreign 
leader, entry is always socially insufficient. Our results show concern to the anti-competitive 
entry regulation policies following the previous literature showing socially excessive entry in 
Cournot oligopolies with homogeneous products and perfectly competitive input sector. 
Hence, policies to foster entry might be needed designed in the presence of market leaders.
3 
If we consider that the Stackelberg leader is an innovator and knowledge spillover, 
which may the outcome of a weak patent system, creates entry of the followers, our results 
suggest that whether entry regulation is justifiable may depend on the patent regime. If a 
weaker patent system reduces the marginal cost of the followers, entry regulation may be 
justifiable if the patent system is very weak so that it creates a small marginal cost difference 
between the leader and the followers. However, if the patent system is sufficiently strong so 
that the marginal cost difference between the leader and the followers is sufficiently large, 
entry should be encouraged. 
                                                            
3 Mukherjee (2007) compares welfare under monopoly and Stackelberg duopoly when the leader and the 
follower differ in terms of marginal costs. However, that paper does not consider free entry, set up cost that 
creates scale economies and social optimality of entry. 4 
 
Our paper complements the literature on insufficient entry in imperfectly competitive 
markets. Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) show insufficient entry in 
monopolistically competitive industries with product diversity. Cabral (2004) compares the 
welfare effects of entry between simultaneous and sequential entry for different degrees of 
product market competition and shows that, in case of sequential entry (which is relevant for 
the present paper), entry can be insufficient if the product market is characterized by (almost) 
Bertrand competition. So, excessive entry under Cournot competition remains in Cabral 
(2004). Ghosh and Morita (2007a, b) show the possibility of insufficient entry in a vertical 
structure where entry occurs in the upstream market. Mukherjee and Mukherjee (2008) show 
insufficient entry in the presence of technology licensing between the incumbent and the 
entrant. Mukherjee (2010) shows insufficient entry in the presence of external economies of 
scale, thus focusing on the positive externalities created by entry. We ignore all the effects 
which create insufficient entry in the above-mentioned papers. The presence of a market 
leader is responsible for insufficient entry in our analysis. Thus, we suggest that if there are 
market leaders, antitrust authorities may need to take policies to encourage entry in an 
industry with quantity setting firms, homogeneous products, no technology transfer, perfectly 
competitive input markets and no positive externalities of entry.  
Lim (2010) and Marjit and Mukherjee (2010) show insufficient entry in an open 
economy with Cournot competition and scale economies. Our analysis for an open economy 
shows that their insufficient entry results remain with market leaders, with and without scale 
economies.     
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and 
shows the results. Section 3 concludes.  5 
 
2. The model and the results 
Consider a firm, which has invented a technology for a product, and can produce the product 
at the marginal cost  l c , which is assumed to be zero for simplicity. We call this firm as 
leader. The leader enters the industry by incurring a fixed cost k .  
We assume that the knowledge of the leader spills over to large number of potential 
entrants in the market. Each entrant can produce the product at a marginal cost of production 
(0 ) c > . Hence, c measures the marginal cost difference between the leader and the entrants, 
and may capture the strength of the patent system and the complexity of the technology, 
which affect the extent of knowledge spillover. However, if a follower wants to produce the 
product, it needs to enter the market by incurring a fixed cost k . If an entrant enters the 
market, we call that entrant as a follower. 
  We consider the following game. At stage 1, the leader enters the market. At stage 2, 
the entrants decide whether to enter the market or not. If there is no entry, the leader produces 
like a monopolist at stage 3, and the profit is realized. If there is entry at stage 2, the leader 
behaves like a Stackelberg leader and the followers behave like Stackelberg followers at 
stage 3, and the profits are realized. We solve the game through backward induction. 
We assume that the inverse market demand function for the product is 
  P = a – q,             ( 1 )  
where P is price of the product and q is the total quantity sold. 









, which will ensure positive outputs of all firms producing in the 








> , which ensures that at least one follower enters the market. This 
assumption also ensures that the net profit (i.e., the operating profit minus the fixed 
cost) of the leader is positive. 
If n followers enter the market, the ith follower maximizes the following expression to 
determine its output, where  1,2,..., in = : 
()
i
i q Max a q c q −− .          ( 2 )  











.         ( 3 )  
Since the leader behaves like a Stackelberg leader, it maximizes the following expression to 
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.          ( 6 )  
It follows from (5) and (6) that as the marginal cost difference between the leader and the 
followers increases, i.e., as c increases, it increases the output of the leader and reduces the 






































.    (7) 
The equilibrium number of followers, denoted by 
* n , is then determined by the 











.          ( 8 )  
It is immediate from (8) that as c increases, it reduces the number of followers in the market, 
thus increasing market concentration. 
  Since the leader takes the entry decision before the followers, it is immediate that the 
entry decisions will effectively be for the followers, which is shown by (8). It is also easy to 
see that if c > 0 and (8) holds, the leader has the incentive to enter the market. 
  Now we want to determine the socially optimal number of followers. We assume that 
the objective of the social planner is to select the number of followers (since the leader will 
enter and has no reason to restrict its entry because of its lower marginal cost compared to the 
followers) that maximizes welfare, given that the firms behave like Stackelberg leader and 
followers. Even if the social planner may affect the number of followers, he cannot influence 
the firms’ behavior in the product market. Hence, first the social planner determines n, after 
which the Stackelberg leader and the followers take their output decisions.  
If there are n followers, the outputs and the profits are shown in (5)-(7). The social 
planner determines the number of followers to maximize welfare, which is the sum of “total 
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The following expression gives the socially optimal number of followers: 
22
3
(3 ) [4 (7 2 (3 ))]
0
4( 1)






.                (10) 
Therefore, entry is insufficient (excessive) if left hand side (LHS) of (10) is positive 
(negative) at the free entry equilibrium number of firms shown in (8). We get that LHS of 
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, we get that 
*m a x * (0, ) cc , since  1 n≥ . 
  The following proposition is then immediate. 
 
Proposition 1: Entry is socially excessive (insufficient) in the presence of scale economies if 
* cc <  (
*m a x * (, ) cc c ∈ . 
 
  The intuition for the above result is as follows. As shown in Mankiw and Whinston 
(1986), entry of new firms steals business from the existing firms when the firms determine 
outputs simultaneously. However, this business stealing effect arises in our analysis only for 
the followers and not for the leaders. In fact, if the number of followers increases, it increases 
the output of the leader (see (5)). Hence, entry creates a positive output effect on the leader 
and this effect gets stronger with the marginal cost difference between the leader and the 
followers. On the other hand, if the marginal cost difference between the leader and the 
followers increases, it reduces the followers’ incentive for entry and increasing market 
concentration. Hence, if the marginal cost difference is higher between the leader and the 
followers, the positive output effect of entry on the leader and the effect of higher market 
concentration dominate the negative business stealing effects of entry on the followers, thus 9 
 
creating insufficient entry. However, if the marginal cost difference between the leader and 
the followers is sufficiently small, the business stealing effects of entry on the followers is the 
dominant force and creates excessive entry. 
  Proposition 1 shows that, in the presence of scale economies, which are created by the 
fixed cost, k, entry may be either excessive or insufficient depending on the marginal cost 
difference between the leader and the followers. Now we will show the implication of scale 
economies by assuming  0 k = . 
 
Proposition 2: If  0 k = , entry is always socially insufficient. 





= . The socially optimal number of firms is 
found from (10) with  0 k = . We get that LHS of (10) is positive at 
* n , which proves the 
result. ■   
 
If there are no scale economies, entry of the followers occurs until the outputs of the 





= . We get that the output of the leader at this 
free entry equilibrium number of firms is 
*
l qa c = − , which is the perfectly competitive 
output at the marginal cost c. However, since the marginal cost of the leader is lower than c 





= , thus creating insufficient entry. Proposition 2 is in contrast to Ghosh and Saha 
(2007), which shows that entry is excessive in a Cournot oligopoly with no scale economies 




2.1. The case of an open economy 
Like most of the literature,
 4 so far we have considered that all firms are from the same 
country, thus considering welfare effects of entry in a closed economy. However, given the 
wave of globalization where foreign competition plays an important role, the purpose of this 
section is to see how the above results change when the Stackelberg leader is a foreign firm.  
It should be noted that the identity of the Stackelberg leader, i.e. whether it is a foreign firm 
or a domestic firm, should not affect the entry decision of the followers. Hence, the free entry 
equilibrium number of firms is given by equation (8). However, if the Stackelberg leader is a 
foreign firm, it will affect the welfare maximization problem, since the profit of the leader 
will not appear in the welfare function. Hence, if the leader is a foreign firm, the domestic 
country maximizes its welfare, which is the sum of consumer surplus and the total profits of 
the Stackelberg followers, to determine the socially optimal number of followers. Hence, the 
domestic country maximizes the following expression: 
22
22
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.                 (12) 
The socially optimal number of domestic followers is then determined from the following 
first order condition: 
22
3
(2 ) (5 3 ) [4 (5 (3 ))]
0
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an a cn cn n n
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+
.              (13) 
Straightforward calculation shows that LHS of (13) is positive at the free entry 
number of followers, given in (8). Hence, entry of the followers is insufficient for the 
domestic country. 
  If the Stackelberg leader is a foreign firm, its profit does not affect domestic welfare. 
Since more followers help to steal business from the Stackelberg leader, though they create 
                                                            
4 Two exceptions are Lim (2010) and Marjit and Mukherjee (2010), which examine the excessive entry theory 
in an open economy under Cournot competition.  11 
 
business stealing effects among the followers, rent extraction from the foreign leader plays an 
important role and creates the socially optimal number of followers higher than the free entry 
equilibrium number of followers. 
  We have seen that entry is socially insufficient in a closed economy irrespective of the 
marginal cost difference between the leader and the followers if  0 k = . It can be shown that if 
0 k =  and the Stackelberg leader is a foreign firm, rent extraction from the foreign leader 
provides further incentive for encouraging entry in the domestic country, thus creating 
insufficient entry in the domestic country. 
  We summarize the discussion of this section in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: If the Stackelberg leader is a foreign firm and the Stackelberg followers are 
domestic firms, entry in the domestic country is always socially insufficient, irrespective of 
the presence of scale economies. 
 
3. Conclusion 
The literature examining social efficiency of entry in oligopolistic markets is dominated by 
the consideration of Cournot oligopolies. However, the real life situation is often different, 
where some firms enjoy dominant positions in the market. 
We use a simple model to examine social efficiency of entry in a Stackelberg leader-
follower structure. We show that entry in a closed economy is socially excessive 
(insufficient) in the presence of scale economies if the marginal cost difference between the 
leader and the followers is small (large), but it is always socially insufficient without scale 
economies. In an open economy with the foreign Stackelberg leader, entry is always socially 
insufficient. Our results show concern to the anti-competitive entry regulation policies 12 
 
following the previous literature showing socially excessive entry in Cournot oligopolies with 
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